Lagos Lights on mainnet
| Step | Transaction | Checker result |
|---|---|---|
| Mint: Lagos Lights #1 | abfb41a2…0cfbda | ITEM 1 VALID |
| Mint: Lagos Lights #2 | 4971340f…a4cca7 | ITEM 2 VALID |
| Mint: Lagos Lights #3 | 9ec4773a…9fa060 | ITEM 3 VALID |
| Seal (block 3,531,330) | d44ab08a…bd61ec | SUPPLY SEALED count=3 |
| Zote #2 to Tobi (block 3,531,336) | 2a4f5bae…5f0a14 | HELD by Tobi, then SPENT after the sale |
| Funding Kemi's buyer wallet (block 3,531,371) | f161bc52…c23c33 | Ordinary shielded payment |
| Sale: Tobi to Kemi (block 3,531,732) | c08b51ee…4cdda0 | HELD by Kemi; LINK VALID, same action |
Checker results
Each result was produced by the read-only checker, asking two independent light-wallet servers (na.zec.rocks and eu.zec.rocks) and refusing if they disagreed.
FINAL txid=d44ab08a…fbd61ec height=3531330
ITEM 1 VALID ITEM 2 VALID ITEM 3 VALID
SUPPLY SEALED count=3 1.3 s
SPENT collection=lagos-lights item=2 hop=1 (Tobi) 1.4 s
spending_txid=c08b51ee…cdda0
HELD collection=lagos-lights item=2 hop=2 (Kemi) 4.9 s
control_signature=VALID
LINK VALID collection=lagos-lights item=2 same_action=1 1.5 s
Attack tests
Run on a private test chain (regtest) with the same code, because they need deliberately dishonest transactions. All were rejected.
- Selling the same zote twice: a new transaction spending an already-spent zote was rejected by the node:
ironwood double-spend: duplicate nullifier. - Fake successor: a forged note with the right hop number but not created in the spending action:
FAIL successor is not in the spent carrier's Action. - Minting after the seal:
FAIL mint_after_FINAL. - A lagging or dishonest server:
FAIL RPC_SERVER_DISAGREEMENT, no result returned. - Wrong payment in a sale: the seller's tool refused to sign when the amount or recipient was changed.
On mainnet, the Try to cheat buttons test old, forged and wrong-key proofs live.
Superseded collection
The first mainnet collection's seal note was encrypted so that even the issuer's viewing key couldn't read it, so it can never verify as sealed. The bug was fixed and Lagos Lights replaced it. It stays here for completeness.
| Step | Transaction | Checker result |
|---|---|---|
| Bootstrap | 89dfe621…8eef16 | Mined |
| Mint #1 | e5eca593…940de6 | Mined |
| Mint #2 | 1d72c7f8…d571eb | Mined |
| Mint #3 | 53470e9b…55a73b | Mined |
| Seal (unreadable, bug) | 018fa54f…0d688b | FAIL supply not sealed |
Cost
Everything above, including the superseded collection, cost about 0.0017 ZEC in network fees. Zotes themselves carry zero value; the sale moved 0.0002 ZEC from Kemi to Tobi.