Mainnet evidence

Every transaction behind Lagos Lights, with the checker's result for each. Click any transaction to open it on a public explorer: you'll see a shielded transaction and nothing else.

Lagos Lights on mainnet

StepTransactionChecker result
Mint: Lagos Lights #1abfb41a2…0cfbdaITEM 1 VALID
Mint: Lagos Lights #24971340f…a4cca7ITEM 2 VALID
Mint: Lagos Lights #39ec4773a…9fa060ITEM 3 VALID
Seal (block 3,531,330)d44ab08a…bd61ecSUPPLY SEALED count=3
Zote #2 to Tobi (block 3,531,336)2a4f5bae…5f0a14HELD by Tobi, then SPENT after the sale
Funding Kemi's buyer wallet (block 3,531,371)f161bc52…c23c33Ordinary shielded payment
Sale: Tobi to Kemi (block 3,531,732)c08b51ee…4cdda0HELD by Kemi; LINK VALID, same action

Checker results

Each result was produced by the read-only checker, asking two independent light-wallet servers (na.zec.rocks and eu.zec.rocks) and refusing if they disagreed.

FINAL txid=d44ab08a…fbd61ec height=3531330
ITEM 1 VALID   ITEM 2 VALID   ITEM 3 VALID
SUPPLY SEALED count=3                                    1.3 s

SPENT collection=lagos-lights item=2 hop=1 (Tobi)          1.4 s
      spending_txid=c08b51ee…cdda0
HELD  collection=lagos-lights item=2 hop=2 (Kemi)          4.9 s
      control_signature=VALID
LINK VALID collection=lagos-lights item=2 same_action=1    1.5 s

Attack tests

Run on a private test chain (regtest) with the same code, because they need deliberately dishonest transactions. All were rejected.

  • Selling the same zote twice: a new transaction spending an already-spent zote was rejected by the node: ironwood double-spend: duplicate nullifier.
  • Fake successor: a forged note with the right hop number but not created in the spending action: FAIL successor is not in the spent carrier's Action.
  • Minting after the seal: FAIL mint_after_FINAL.
  • A lagging or dishonest server: FAIL RPC_SERVER_DISAGREEMENT, no result returned.
  • Wrong payment in a sale: the seller's tool refused to sign when the amount or recipient was changed.

On mainnet, the Try to cheat buttons test old, forged and wrong-key proofs live.

Superseded collection

The first mainnet collection's seal note was encrypted so that even the issuer's viewing key couldn't read it, so it can never verify as sealed. The bug was fixed and Lagos Lights replaced it. It stays here for completeness.

StepTransactionChecker result
Bootstrap89dfe621…8eef16Mined
Mint #1e5eca593…940de6Mined
Mint #21d72c7f8…d571ebMined
Mint #353470e9b…55a73bMined
Seal (unreadable, bug)018fa54f…0d688bFAIL supply not sealed

Cost

Everything above, including the superseded collection, cost about 0.0017 ZEC in network fees. Zotes themselves carry zero value; the sale moved 0.0002 ZEC from Kemi to Tobi.